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Glenn's avatar

You seem to have a lot of head canon about me that's not true.

1. I'm agnostic as to the efficient cause of the Ukraine war, as I think everyone should be. When I say there's merit to the idea that it was a security dilemma, I'm saying it's plausible. It's also plausible that Putin is a revisionist actor. In the context of the Noah Smith article, I raise this just to point out itโ€™s not 100% clear, as he seems to believe, that Russia is a cartoonishly evil revanchist empire.

2. I have never said nor insinuated that "the Russians innocently defend themselves from the schoolyard bullies of the international order." This is such a ridiculous belief to impute to me that I have no idea where you even think I would have said this.

3. I think the U.S.-led post-1945 international order is generally a good thing. As I've said many times, the great power peace after World War II has been kept by U.S. material preponderance and strategic restraint, U.S.-backed norms of territorial integrity, commercial globalization, and nuclear deterrence. I hope the United States maintains its command of the commons and I wish it would continue to build and participate in multilateral institutions. I even think we should give a lot of asymmetric weapons to Taiwan and it was a good thing to arm Ukraine immediately after the war began because it was necessary to maintain territorial integrity norms.

4. That said, there is very clearly a culture of groupthink and unreflective hawkishness in U.S. foreign policy. And ironically, after 1989, the United States has become the preeminent revisionist actor. This is what you would expect from a state that's materially powerful enough to revise the system in its favor and commit grave errors like invading Iraq without having to fear losing its position as the hegemon. If China was as powerful in relative terms as the United States has been over the past 35 years, it would act the same way. (This is also why it's reasonable to think the United States is much more driven by "brutish ignorance and bravado" than other states. Other states don't have the leeway to act like that.)

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I take the two arguments here to be (1) I'm wrong for thinking the international security environment is generally fine as long as the United States doesn't do anything rash, and (2) I'm wrong for thinking it's not in the interest of Ukrainians to keep arming Ukraine.

On (1), I'll say: There are several ways to do epistemics in International Relations. You seem to be relying on priors -- "Why would we expect the worst intentions of ourselves and the best of our enemies?" -- but priors should be superseded if you have a plausible theory supported by empirical evidence. I've already given one reason we should expect other states to be rational: They can't afford not to be rational, or they'd be knocked out of the international system and replaced by other, more rational states. Do you think if North Korea wasn't rational they'd have been able to outlast every other member of the Soviet bloc besides Cuba? Would Iran have been able to survive for 45 years?

Two other reasons to think the international security environment is fine: (1) the only near-peer competitor to the United States is China, and China is located in a maritime environment in which itโ€™s notoriously difficult to project power; and (2) the pillars of the long peace need not be in crisis unless U.S. policymakers choose to put them in crisis.

The United States has declined relative to China, but its economic and military power as a share of global power has been remarkably stable and it retains a virtual monopoly on power projection platforms.

Economic globalization need not recede -- thatโ€™s an intentional policy choice on part of the United States.

Territorial integrity norms were shaken by the invasion of Ukraine, but Russia has faced large enough costs over the past three years that itโ€™s not clear why theyโ€™d be seriously undermined even if Russia was ceded the Donbas.

Nuclear deterrence will hold as long as the United States doesnโ€™t pursue missile defense.

And thatโ€™s consistent with the behavior weโ€™ve seen from the states that supposedly make up the โ€œNew Axis,โ€ with the possible exception of Russia which is a declining power anyway. Iโ€™ve been over the evidence for this in my previous articles.

On (2), youโ€™re totally misunderstanding the context of that note. There is nothing in it that suggests I think โ€œthe primary motivation for American hawks is โ€˜we want to beat up on the bad guys,โ€™ and that any other spoken justification is simply a facade.โ€ As Iโ€™ve mentioned, it was a good thing to arm Ukraine immediately after the invasion to uphold territory integrity norms. Now, Iโ€™ll note that several statements by Biden administration officials suggest a big motivator for aiding Ukraine was to kill a lot of Russians, but that wasnโ€™t the sole motivation.

The note replies to a particular defense of a policy of fighting to the last Ukrainian that Iโ€™ve seen several people offer: โ€œUkraineโ€ wants to fight, so it does no harm to Ukrainians to keep them fighting. But since most Ukrainian soldiers, and all Ukrainian civilians, did not sign up to die, thatโ€™s an absurdly bad argument.

The best response, which you allude to, is that a Russian occupation of Ukraine will be very bad for Ukrainians (and it will). But this doesnโ€™t change anything. Ukraine isnโ€™t going to win back its territory in any scenario. The choices are: sue for peace now and give up territory, or get more people killed and give up more territory when youโ€™re forced to sue for peace later. The former is obviously the better option.

If there was a reasonable argument that time is on Ukraineโ€™s side, then there might be a case for keeping the war going (although it would depend on how many more people would get killed in the war vs. how bad the occupation would be). But thereโ€™s not. Itโ€™s been a war of attrition since late 2022 -- (when, by the way, Mark Milley said the Ukrainians should seek an end to the war -- is Milley some sort of Caplanite pacifist?) -- and Russia, as the stronger party with deeper interests in Eastern Europe than it will ever be rational for the United States to have, is favored in a war of attrition.

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Finally, on the callousness thing, I consider it a lot more callous to think thousands of Ukrainian and Russian conscripts should be forced through the meat grinder than to think the Ukrainian government should suffer a little humiliation. The commander in chief of the Ukrainian armed forces is nicknamed the Butcher because he has so little regard for the lives of his own service members. I donโ€™t care about the Ukrainian stateโ€™s interests unless they coincide with humanitarian interests.

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Max Shtein's avatar

Would be willing to bet $5-50 this gay Glenn guy never experienced life in an authoritarianโ€”let alone a totalitarianโ€”country/regime.

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