I am going to take a very hawkish stance in this essay, and attempt to persuade you to take it too. But I do need to establish the right mood.
Since Hamas’ massacre of Israeli civilians on October 7, 2023, more than 40,000 Palestinians in Gaza have been killed. Many of these were probably terrorists, but many were not. This is a terrible shame, and it’d be much better if Israel and the world could be made safer without this loss.
Similarly, Israeli strikes in Lebanon have killed thousands—again, including many militants and terrorists, and many civilians. Tens of thousands (perhaps millions, now) have been displaced on each side of the border. These are very bad consequences, and they set a high standard for the expected benefit of Israeli operations.
I believe that standard is met.
In this essay, I won’t attempt to relitigate Israeli actions against Hamas since October 7. I’ve written a piece already which tangentially addresses the most salient criticisms:
For now, suffice it to say that genocide is not happening. Israeli strikes and incursions have been targeted, careful, and proportionate—but subject to error. Tragic error, but marginal and inconsequential in the grand scheme.
In any case, the focus now is on Lebanon. On September 17, Israel updated its war goals to include the return of more than 90,000 displaced residents to their homes—they’d been evacuated as a result of shelling, rocket, and missile attacks from Hezbollah, a US-designated terrorist organization operating mostly in southern Lebanon.
Hezbollah is also a political force. Since the Lebanese civil war, they’ve held seats in parliament and occasional cabinet ministries. But their influence comes largely from their paramilitary wing—they’re considered the most powerful and organized non-state actor in the world.
And that’s entirely thanks to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Hezbollah swears allegiance to the Ayatollah—the IR was responsible for the formation of the group, they provide the bulk of its funding, and even issue its fighting orders. Hezbollah is the most powerful organ of the IR’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ against Israel and the West.
Israel has tolerated Hezbollah’s presence on its northern border for decades. After it invaded Lebanon in 2006 with the intent of rooting out and destroying the group,1 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1701: Israel was to withdraw from southern Lebanon, and Hezbollah was to disarm.
Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon, and Hezbollah refused to disarm. Hezbollah has since stockpiled tens (perhaps hundreds) of thousands of rockets right on the Israeli border. Their special operations Radwan Force has remained on the Blue Line in violation of Resolution 1701—with the explicit aim of infiltrating Israeli territory.
Since October 8, Hezbollah has launched more than 10,000 rockets at Israel, and on September 25, they even fired a missile at Tel Aviv.2
Israel, since changing its war goals, has struck back with a vengeance. On September 17, thousands of pagers purchased and used by Hezbollah (in an attempt to stave off Israeli telecommunication spying) spontaneously detonated, killing a dozen and injuring thousands more. Israel didn’t claim responsibility, but they absolutely probably almost certainly were responsible.
The very next day, walkie-talkies purchased by Hezbollah for the same reason blew up in the same way, killing 20 and injuring hundreds. Again, Israel has not claimed responsibility.
These attacks had tragic consequences for some unlucky Lebanese civilians, including children. But they also killed and wounded thousands of militants, and knocked out the organization’s communication infrastructure.
For the next two weeks, Israel engaged in dozens of targeted killings and air strikes on Hezbollah launch sites, as its leaders’ rhetoric became more and more explicitly hawkish, and the world grew increasingly concerned.
Over the course of a dramatic weekend, it seemed like a 21-day ceasefire was likely; then Israeli PM Netanyahu backed out of the deal he’d apparently agreed to; and finally Netanyahu, after addressing the UN General Assembly, cut a press conference short to order a strike on Hezbollah headquarters—killing its leader, Hassan Nasrallah.
Nasrallah had been in hiding since a failed assassination attempt in 2008. Between his killing and the elimination of several more Hezbollah commanders, the organization’s chain of command was almost totally wiped out.
It now appears likely that Israel will conduct a ground operation against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. I believe this is the right course of action, though, apparently, much of the world does not.
Press coverage focuses on how ‘emboldened’ Israel is. Hezbollah leadership (or what’s left of it) is visibly shaken. And, while I worry for the fate of the citizens of southern Lebanon, I can see no better outcome than the destruction of Hezbollah’s military capacity.
My dream scenario is this: Israel utterly demolishes Hezbollah’s infrastructure, chain of command, and morale. The organization, physically cut off from the IR and losing the support of its own soldiers, fails to maintain its extortionist grip on Lebanese politics. The peace-loving Lebanese regain control of their country—Beirut can become, once again, the Paris of the Middle East.
The Ayatollah loses influence in the Levant. Israeli citizens return home, safer than ever. This gives Netanyahu the political cover to end the war in Gaza, which leads to Saudi normalization, and a more formal Sunni-Israeli pact against the Islamic Republic.
I’ve started to deviate somewhat from probable reality, unfortunately. But among the likely outcomes, there’s still more than enough good to be found.
Israel may remain strictly true to its war goals. It may simply establish a buffer on the Lebanese side of the border—something akin to what Resolution 1701 called for—and allow its citizens to return home. Internally displaced Lebanese will suffer, but Hezbollah will suffer more. Its influence and popularity in Lebanon will wane further (a plurality of Lebanese ‘strongly disagree’ with the claim that Hezbollah is good for the Arab world), and Iranian influence will be somewhat diminished.
The most likely part of my dream scenario is the severing of physical weapons supply routes between Iran and Lebanon. Already Israel has made a point of destroying infrastructure used to smuggle arms to Hezbollah and have warned very strongly against the illicit use of the Beirut International Airport.3
If Israel can successfully cut Hezbollah off, the Middle East will become much safer. In fact, the entire world will—Hezbollah has been responsible for horrific terrorist attacks in Argentina, Bulgaria, Turkey, and more.
Lebanon’s situation will also be improved. Any harm that comes to Hezbollah is a benefit to Lebanese society. Iranian-sponsored shi’ite Islamism parasitically attached itself to the country after a series of poor state-building decisions by the Maronite Christian majority in the 20th century, and we should be doing all we can to excise it. Until we do, Lebanon will remain a hopelessly failed state.
The other significant possible result of this flare-up is a larger regional war. This was a big concern back in October and November last year, as the world urged Israel not to attack Hezbollah then (or even retaliate against Hamas too roughly)—for fear of Houthi and direct Iranian involvement.
This is the scenario that most of the world most wants to avoid. It may credibly increase the risk of great power war (the China-Russia-Iran alliance is strong and getting stronger), and would certainly lead to more civilian casualties.
Then again. The IR is a horribly terrible state to live in. They have no respect for democracy. They have no respect for human rights. They have no respect for the international order or for nuclear non-proliferation. Iran is a rogue state, and we can only let them get away with it for so long.
Broader regional war might be the only way to effect regime change in Iran. If this could be done without risking a larger war with China—a big if—tens of millions of lives would massively improve overnight.
Soon after news of Nasrallah’s assassination broke, Ayatollah Khamenei went into hiding. The Islamic Republic is afraid of what Israel might be able to do to it. How they might restore the people of Iran to a life of freedom and dignity.
There are more possibilities to think about. None of the analysis I’ve done is rigorous, much less quantitative. I don’t necessarily know how to weigh the risk of great power war.
But I do know that aggressive and bold Israeli actions have restored deterrence and fear in the Middle East. Hezbollah’s leaders are sweating and the IR’s are hiding in caves.
If ever there were a time to strike, decisively and resolutely—now is that time.
Cover photo from Wikimedia Commons
This was a direct response to Hezbollah provocation: a cross-border raid which killed three and kidnapped two Israeli soldiers.
It’s important to understand the difference between a ‘rocket’ and a ‘missile’ to grasp the severity of this event: rockets are dumb. Think fireworks, but scaled up, and with about 50-100 kg of high explosive on the end. Hezbollah launches these and, much like Werner Von Braun, they don’t care where they come down.
Missiles are what well-funded modern militaries use. They have precision guidance and can change direction in-flight. They carry closer to 500-1000 kg of high explosive, and go right where you want them to. Aiming one of these at a major population center is hugely provocative.
The most striking example of this: an Iranian plane bound for Beirut “made a U-turn over Iraqi airspace … after Israel took control of the airport’s control tower and warned it would use force if the plane landed in Lebanon.” (ToI)
(As a sidenote: I hope this makes clear Israel’s commitment to avoiding civilian damage and casualties. Rather than attack the plane or the airport, the IDF went to the trouble of hacking the control tower to give a verbal warning. They were fully justified under international law to use pure force instead—but didn’t, because this is a moral army!)